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AboriginAl TiTle in CAnAdA: SiTe-SpeCifiC
or TerriToriAl?
Kent McNeil*
This article describes three different approaches to Aboriginal title in
Canada: (1) a common law approach, whereby title is based on
physical occupation and defined by the common law; (2) an Indigenous
law approach, whereby it is based on and defined by Indigenous law;
(3) a territorial approach, whereby it is based on occupation of
territory by effective control, manifested in part through the exercise of
governmental authority. The author argues that the third approach,
“territorial Aboriginal title,” is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
1997 decision in the Delgamuukw case, and supports an inherent right
of self-government because it includes jurisdictional elements as well
as property rights. He suggests that the Court should follow this
approach in its important up-coming decision in the Tsilhqot’in Nation
case.
Cet article décrit trois façons différentes d’envisager le droit de propriété
autochtone au Canada:(1) une approche dite «de common law» selon
laquelle le droit de propriété est fondé sur l’occupation physique telle
qu’elle est définie par la common law, (2) une approche de droit
autochtone en vertu de laquelle il est analysé et défini selon le droit
autochtone, (3) une approche territoriale fondée sur l’occupation réelle
et la maîtrise tangible du territoire manifestées notamment par l’exercice
du pouvoir dévolu au gouvernement. L’auteur soutient que la troisième
approche, « le droit de propriété autochtone territorial », correspond à la
position de la Cour suprême exprimée dans l’arrêt Delgamuukw rendu
en 1997. Il appuie également le principe d’un droit inhérent à la
gouvernance autonome, car elle comporte des éléments de compétence et
de droits de propriété. L’auteur espère que la Cour adoptera cette
approche dans l’important arrêt qu’elle rendra prochainement dans
l’affaire Tsilhqot’in Nation.

*

Osgoode Hall Law School. In addition to the very helpful feedback received
from fellow panelists and the other participants at the Law on the Edge Conference,
Canadian Law and Society Association/Law and Society Association of Australia and
New Zealand, University of British Columbia, July 1-4 2013, I would like to thank Kerry
Wilkins for his very useful comments.
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1. Introduction
This paper addresses the issue of Aboriginal title to land, and the
relationship I see between Indigenous law and the common law in this
context. In my understanding, there have been three judicial approaches to
Aboriginal title:
1. A purely proprietary approach, based on occupation of land and
the effect given to occupation by the common law (common law
Aboriginal title).
2. An Indigenous law approach, whereby Aboriginal title arises from
and is defined by pre-existing Indigenous law (Indigenous law
title).
3. A territorial approach, whereby Aboriginal title is derived from
both common law and Indigenous law and has governmental
dimensions (territorial Aboriginal title).1
I am going to describe each of these, and then offer some critical comments
on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v Marshall; R v Bernard 2
and the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s more recent decision in
William v British Columbia (the Tsilhqot’in Nation case).3
2. Common Law Aboriginal Title
It is an obvious historical fact that Indigenous peoples were living in North
America, and occupying and using land in accordance with their own ways
of life, when the Europeans arrived and began to colonize the continent. In
the settled parts of Canada first colonized by the British, the settlers
brought the common law with them.4
Under the common law, people who are in occupation of land are
presumed to have possession and thus title to the land they occupy.5 So
1
Brian Slattery, “The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title” (2006) 85 Can Bar
Rev 255 [Slattery, “Metamorphosis”], has identified three similar conceptions of
Aboriginal title. However, he describes the third, which he supports, as “a sui generis
right grounded in ancient relations between the Crown and Indigenous peoples;” see ibid
at 263, elaborated on at 269-79.
2
2005 SCC 43, [2005] 2 SCR 220 [Marshall/Bernard].
3
2012 BCCA 285, [2012] 3 CNLR 333 (BCCA) [Tsilhqot’in Nation ].
4
Connolly v Woolrich (1867), 17 RJRQ 75 (Que SC), aff’d (sub nom Johnstone
v Connolly ) (1869), 17 RJRQ 266 (Que QB).
5
Calder v British Columbia, [1973] SCR 313 per Hall J (dissenting on other
grounds) at 368, 375 [Calder].
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Indigenous peoples would have title under the common law to the lands
they occupied at the time of the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty.6 This
common law Aboriginal title neither depends on, nor is defined by,
Indigenous law. It is a wholly common law concept. Moreover, it is purely
proprietary; it does not necessarily entail governmental authority or
political jurisdiction.
I would characterize the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to
Aboriginal title in Marshall/Bernard and the British Columbia Court of
Appeal’s approach in the Tsilhqot’in Nation case as a proprietary, common
law approach. I will come back to those decisions later.
3. Indigenous Law Title
In addition to occupying and using land, the Indigenous peoples of Canada
had their own legal orders at the time of European colonization.7 These
legal orders included laws in relation to land.8
At the time of the British Crown’s assertion of sovereignty, those laws
and the land rights of the Indigenous peoples under those laws would have
continued by virtue of the doctrine of continuity.9 This doctrine has been
6

Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at paras 114, 149
[Delgamuukw]; Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1989), esp at 196-221 [McNeil, Aboriginal Title]. Crown assertion of sovereignty also
raises issues of legality and legitimacy that I have addressed elsewhere; see Kent McNeil,
“Negotiated Sovereignty: Indian Treaties and the Acquisition of American and Canadian
Territorial Rights in the Pacific Northwest,” in Alexandra Harmon, ed, The Power of
Promises: Rethinking Indian Treaties in the Pacific Northwest (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 2008) 35; and Kent McNeil, “Indigenous Nations and the Legal
Relativity of European Claims to Territorial Sovereignty in North America,” in Sandra
Tomsons and Lorraine Mayer, eds, Philosophy and Aboriginal Rights: Critical Dialogues
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2013) 242.
7
See John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2010).
8
See e.g. Leroy Little Bear, “Aboriginal Rights and the Canadian ‘Grundnorm,’”
in J Rick Ponting, ed, Arduous Journey: Canadian Indians and Decolonization (Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 1986) 243; Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,
Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, vol 2, Restructuring the
Relationship (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1996) pt 2 at 434-64;
Richard Overstall, “Encountering the Spirit in the Land: ‘Property’ in a Kinship-Based
Legal Order,” in John McLaren, AR Buck, and Nancy E Wright, eds, Despotic Dominion:
Property Rights in British Settler Societies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005) 22.
9
See Brian Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples
(Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1979) at 50-59; Mark D
Walters, “The ‘Golden Thread’ of Continuity: Aboriginal Customs at Common Law and
Under the Constitution Act, 1982” (1999) 44 McGill LJ 711; Kent McNeil and David
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applied in Canada to the land rights of the French Canadians when Britain
acquired New France from the French king in 1763.10
The doctrine of continuity has also been adopted and applied in the
context of the land rights of the Indigenous peoples of Australia by the
High Court, initially in Mabo v Queensland 11 in 1992. As a result, in
Australia the source of native title (as Aboriginal title is called there) is the
pre-existing laws and customs of the Indigenous peoples. Moreover, native
title in Australia also receives its content and is defined by Indigenous laws
and customs.12 This sounds positive for Indigenous Australians because
their laws are acknowledged and given effect. However, this approach has
serious downsides.13
First of all, in order to have their land rights acknowledged by the
Australian legal system, Indigenous Australians have to do more than
prove that they occupied and used land at the time of Crown assertion of
sovereignty. They also have to establish that they had laws or customs in
relation to the land that gave them legal rights at that time. As this involves
establishment of the legal orders of non-literate societies over 200 years
ago (in eastern Australia), the problems of proof can be formidable.
Secondly, in Australia native title rights are limited to pre-existing
rights. So if at the time of Crown acquisition of sovereignty an Indigenous
people did not have laws or customs in relation to minerals, for example,
they are not entitled to mineral rights on their native title lands.14 The
content of their land rights is thus frozen in the past at a time when they
lived as hunters and gatherers.
Thirdly, under Australian law the Indigenous peoples have no inherent
right of self-government. While some modification of their pre-existing
Yarrow, “Has Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal Rights Adversely Affected Their
Definition?” (2007) 37 Sup Ct L Rev (2nd) 177 at 203-11.
10
See Drulard v Welsh (1906), 11 OLR 647 (Ont Div Ct), rev’d on other grounds
(1907), 14 OLR 54 (Ont CA). Admittedly, New France is regarded as having been
acquired by Britain by conquest and cession rather than by settlement, but the High Court
of Australia, in the cases cited in the next two notes, has held that the doctrine of
continuity applies in settled territories as well. See also McNeil, Aboriginal Title, supra
note 6 at 179-92.
11
(1992), 175 CLR 1.
12
See Fejo v Northern Territory (1998), 195 CLR 96; Western Australia v Ward
(2002), 213 CLR 1 [Ward]; Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria
(2002), 214 CLR 422 [Yorta Yorta].
13
See Simon Young, The Trouble with Tradition: Native Title and Cultural
Change (Sydney: Federation Press, 2008).
14
Ward, supra note 12.
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land rights is possible, they have no inherent jurisdiction to make new laws
in relation to land or anything else.15
Fourthly, the High Court has held that loss of connection with the land
and significant gaps in the practice of Indigenous laws and customs result
in loss of native title.16 This is so even if the loss of connection was caused
by forcible dispossession by the colonizers.17
So far, Indigenous law has not been applied by Canadian courts in the
way it has been in Australia. McLachlin J suggested in her dissent in R v
Van der Peet18 that it would be appropriate to base Aboriginal rights and
title at least in part on pre-existing Indigenous law,19 but her decision as
Chief Justice in Marshall/Bernard is anything but an Indigenous law
approach.
4. Territorial Aboriginal Title
Under this approach, Indigenous land rights are not limited to property
rights, as they are under the first two approaches. Instead, Indigenous
peoples have governmental authority (that is, political jurisdiction) over
the territories occupied by them at the time of Crown assertion of
sovereignty, in addition to rights to the lands and resources within those
territories.20 This is the approach that has been taken in the United States

15

Yorta Yorta, supra note 12.
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
18
[1996] 2 SCR 507 at paras 261-75 [Van der Peet].
19
See also Mitchell v MNR, 2001 SCC 33, [2001] 1 SCR 911 [Mitchell], per
McLachlin CJC, delivering the main judgment (Binnie and Major JJ concurring in result)
at para 10:
[A]boriginal interests and customary laws were presumed to survive the assertion of
sovereignty, and were absorbed into the common law as rights, unless (1) they were
incompatible with the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty, (2) they were surrendered
voluntarily via the treaty process, or (3) the government extinguished them ….
Barring one of these exceptions, the practices, customs and traditions that defined
the various aboriginal societies as distinctive cultures continued as part of the law
of Canada: see Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] SCR 313,
and Mabo v Queensland (1992), 175 CLR 1 at 57 (per Brennan J), pp 81-82 (per
Deane and Gaudron JJ), and pp 182-83 (per Toohey J).
20
See Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Rights in Canada: From Title to Land to
Territorial Sovereignty” (1998) 5 Tulsa J of Comp and Int’l L 253, reprinted in Kent
McNeil, Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia
(Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2001) 58 at 95-101
[McNeil, Emerging Justice?].
16

750

LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN

[Vol. 91

ever since the celebrated Cherokee Nation cases decided by Chief Justice
Marshall in the 1830s.21
In numerous cases before the Indian Claims Commission that went up
on review to the Court of Claims, the issue was whether the land in
question had been part of the territory that the claimant Indian nation
occupied and controlled for a long time before it was wrongfully taken by
the US government.22 If it had been, then prior to the taking the Indian
nation would have had both title to the land and jurisdiction over it, as held
by Marshall CJ in the Cherokee cases.23
What about Canada? Although the territorial title approach was not
explicitly adopted in Delgamuukw v British Columbia24 (the leading
Aboriginal title case in Canada), I think Lamer CJC’s decision points
undeniably in that direction. He said that there are two potential sources of
Aboriginal title: (1) occupation of land and the legal effect given to
occupation by the common law – the common law Aboriginal title
approach; and (2) Aboriginal systems of law – the Indigenous law
approach.25
But, as I read his judgment, he then combined the two into an approach
based on occupation that incorporates both physical occupation and
occupation through the application of Indigenous law:
[T]he source of aboriginal title appears to be grounded both in the common law and
in the aboriginal perspective on land; the latter includes, but is not limited to, their
systems of law. It follows that both should be taken into account in establishing the
proof of occupancy.26
21

Cherokee Nation v Georgia, 30 US 1 (1831); Worcester v Georgia, 31 US 515

(1832).
22
See e.g. Sac and Fox Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v United States, 161 Ct Cl
189 (1963), cert denied 375 US 921 (1963); Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs
Reservation of Oregon v United States, 177 Ct Cl 184 (1966); United States v Seminole
Indians, 180 Ct Cl 375 (1967); Sac and Fox Tribe v United States, 383 F 2d 991 (1967,
Ct Cl), cert. denied 389 U.S. 900 (1967); Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v
United States, 490 F 2d 935 (1974, Ct Cl); United States v Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513
F 2d 1383 (1975, Ct Cl). For a very useful survey of relevant American case law, see
Michael J Kaplan, “Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands”
(2003) 41 ALR Fed 425. See also Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, Nell Jessup
Newton, ed (New Providence, NJ: LexisNexis, 2012), §15.04[2] [Cohen’s Handbook].
23
See Cohen’s Handbook, ibid, §15.04[2]. See also United States v Santa Fe
Pacific Railroad, 314 US 339 (1941).
24
Delgamuukw, supra note 6.
25
Ibid at para 114.
26
Ibid at para 147.
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Elaborating on Indigenous law as a means of proving occupation, Lamer
CJC continued:
As a result, if, at the time of sovereignty, an aboriginal society had laws in relation to
land, those laws would be relevant to establishing the occupation of lands which are
the subject of a claim for aboriginal title. Relevant laws might include, but are not
limited to, a land tenure system or laws governing land use.27

Other examples of relevant Indigenous laws are contained in this passage:
[T]he aboriginal group asserting the claim to aboriginal title may have trespass laws
which are proof of exclusive occupation, such that the presence of trespassers does not
count as evidence against exclusivity. As well, aboriginal laws under which permission
may be granted to other aboriginal groups to use or reside even temporarily on land
would reinforce the finding of exclusive occupation. Indeed, if that permission were
the subject of treaties between the aboriginal nations in question, those treaties would
also form part of the aboriginal perspective.28

Occupation through Indigenous law is a territorial approach: Indigenous
peoples were in occupation of their traditional territories because they had
laws, including laws in relation to land, that applied in those territories. To
put it another way, they were in occupation because they exercised
governmental authority over their territories, in part through the
application of their own laws. Lamer CJC acknowledged this exercise of
governmental authority not only by recognizing their capacity to make
their own laws, but also by concluding that permission to use lands could
be granted by treaty to other Aboriginal nations, as treaty-making authority
is one of the attributes of independent, self-governing nations.29
International law relies on the same criteria for acquiring title to
territory (also known as territorial sovereignty), namely, physical
occupation and exercise of governmental authority.30 International law
therefore recognizes that the exercise of governmental authority over land
is necessarily territorial. In domestic contexts, this exercise of authority by
Indigenous peoples supports continuing self-government power, whether

27

Ibid at para 148.
Ibid at para 157.
29
See James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 369-71; Malcolm N Shaw, International Law,
6th ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 198, 902-904.
30
Island of Palmas Case, (1928) 2 RIAA 829; Legal Status of Eastern Greenland
Case, (1933) 2 PCIJ, Series A/B, No 43; Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, 1953 ICJR 47.
See Crawford, ibid at 221-26; Shaw, ibid at 502-507.
28
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regarded as residual sovereignty of the Indian nations, as in the US,31 or as
an inherent right of self-government of First Nations, as held by
Williamson J of the British Columbia Supreme Court in Campbell v British
Columbia.32
So by acknowledging Indigenous law as a source of Aboriginal title
and as a basis for proving occupation of land, Lamer CJC’s approach to
Aboriginal title in Delgamuukw was necessarily territorial. His conception
of Aboriginal title therefore entailed both property rights and political
authority.33
5. Regressing to Common Law Aboriginal Title in Canada
Surprisingly, in Marshall/Bernard McLachlin CJC ignored the Indigenous
law aspects, and hence the territorial dimensions, of Lamer CJC’s decision
in Delgamuukw. She focused instead on physical occupation, and seems to
have confined the role of Aboriginal perspectives to Aboriginal practices
that the common law then translates into legal rights.34 At the same time,
she disagreed explicitly with the territorial approach that had been taken by
Cromwell JA of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal and Daigle JA of the
New Brunswick Court of Appeal, favouring instead a site-specific
approach whereby Aboriginal title has to be established by proof of
physical occupation of specific sites (in this instance, where the Mi’kmaq
accused had harvested timber).
In their minority judgment, LeBel and Fish JJ disagreed forcibly with
McLachlin CJC’s approach, which they thought relied too heavily on the

31

See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 22, §4.01.
[2000] 4 CNLR 1 [Campbell]. For more detailed discussion, see Kent McNeil,
“Judicial Approaches to Self-Government since Calder: Searching for Doctrinal
Coherence,” in Hamar Foster, Heather Raven, and Jeremy Webber, eds, Let Right Be
Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and the Future of Indigenous Rights
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 129 [McNeil, “Judicial Approaches”].
33
See Campbell, supra note 32, esp at paras 134-38, where Williamson J also
relied on the fact that Lamer CJC had held that Aboriginal title is communal and that
Aboriginal nations have decision-making authority over their communally-held lands –
authority that Williamson J said must be governmental in nature. For further discussion,
see Kent McNeil, “The Post-Delgamuukw Nature and Content of Aboriginal Title”, in
McNeil, Emerging Justice?, supra note 20 at 102 [McNeil, “Post-Delgamuukw”];
McNeil, “Judicial Approaches,” ibid.
34
For critical commentary, see “Special Forum: Perspectives on R. v Marshall;
R. v Bernard” (2006) 55 UNBLJ 73; Slattery, “Metamorphosis,” supra note 1 at 279-81.
32
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common law and did not take account of Indigenous law and Indigenous
conceptions of territory.35
I find McLachlin CJC’s decision puzzling, in part because she
concurred with Lamer CJC in Delgamuukw and thus seemed to endorse his
acceptance of the role of Indigenous law in proving occupation, which I
have argued is necessarily a territorial approach.36 She also purported to
follow the Delgamuukw decision in Marshall/Bernard. Moreover, in
previous judgments she spoke of the “golden thread” of continuity of
Indigenous law from pre-contact times to the present and said that
Aboriginal rights that are sourced in Indigenous law continue until either
surrendered by treaty or extinguished by legislation.37
Unfortunately, McLachlin CJC’s limited, common law approach and
her reliance on physical occupation have now been applied even more
strictly by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in the Tsilhqot’in Nation
case. Moreover, Groberman JA, whose judgment was concurred in by
Levine and Tysoe JJA, adopted the site-specific approach used by
McLachlin CJC in Marshall/Bernard, even though Vickers J at trial in
Tsilhqot’in Nation had pointed out that an Aboriginal title claim to a
territory is different from a claim to Aboriginal title to specific sites in the
context of a defence to a prosecution, as in Marshall/Bernard.38
Groberman JA limited Aboriginal title to “definite tract[s] of land the
boundaries of which are reasonably capable of definition.”39 He regarded
definite tracts as “specific sites on which hunting, fishing, or resource
extraction activities took place on a regular and intensive basis,” such as
“salt licks, narrow defiles between mountains and cliffs, particular rocks or
promontories used for netting salmon, or, in other areas of the country,
buffalo jumps.”40 In the numbered treaties, however, where vast areas of
land were surrendered, the whole treaty area was defined and referred to as
35
Marshall/Bernard, supra note 2, esp at paras 110, 127-30. LeBel and Fish JJ
concurred in result on the basis of the evidence, but disagreed with the majority on the
correct approach to proving Aboriginal title.
36
For critical discussion, see Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Supreme
Court: What’s Happening?” (1996) 69 Sask L Rev 281 [McNeil, “What’s Happening?”].
37
Van der Peet, supra note 18 at paras 263-67; Mitchell, supra note 19 at para
10, as quoted.
38
See Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, [2008] 1 CNLR 112 (BCSC) at para
582 [Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC]. On the inappropriateness of litigating Aboriginal title
claims in the context of prosecutions, see Marshall/Bernard, supra note 2 at paras 14244, per LeBel J; Shin Imai, “The Adjudication of Historical Evidence: A Comment and
an Elaboration on a Proposal by Justice LeBel” (2006) 55 UNBLJ 146.
39
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 3 at para 230.
40
Ibid at para 221.
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a “tract,” revealing that the term “definite tract” tells us nothing about the
size of the area in question.41 Moreover, when Lamer CJC stated in
Delgamuukw that physical occupation could be established by “regular use
of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing or otherwise exploiting its
resources,”42 he did not say that the use had to be intensive; that
qualification was added by Groberman JA.43 Instead, Lamer CJC referred
to the following passage from my book, Common Law Aboriginal Title:
Definite tracts over which they [the Indigenous people in question] herded domestic
animals, and lands to which they resorted on a regular basis to hunt, fish, or collect
the natural products of the earth, should be included [in the area occupied by them] as
well, particularly if other individuals and groups were generally excluded therefrom.
Probably even outlying areas that were visited occasionally, and regarded as being
under their exclusive control, would also be occupied by them in much the same way
as the waste of a manor would be occupied by the lord, though he might seldom go
there.44

As we shall see below, the common law standard for occupation that
Lamer CJC found to be applicable in this context does not require intensive
use, or indeed any use at all in some circumstances – rather, what really
counts is the intention to possess and the exclusion of others.
My main criticisms of the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision
in the Tsilhqot’in Nation case are therefore twofold.45 First, even if one

41
See e.g.Treaty 3 (1873), in Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the
Indians (Toronto: Belfords, Clarke & Co, 1880) 320 at 322: “The tract comprised within
the lines above described embracing an area of fifty-five thousand square miles.” Treaty
8 (1899), covering an even larger area, provided that “the said Indians … shall have right
to pursue their usual vocations of hunting, trapping and fishing throughout the tract
surrendered as hereinbefore described;” see Treaty No 8, reprinted from the 1899 edition
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966) 12.
42
Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para 149.
43
McLachlin CJC did use the word “intensive” in Marshall/Bernard, supra note
2, but not as a requirement. She stated at para 70:
In summary, exclusive possession in the sense of intention and capacity to control
is required to establish aboriginal title. Typically, this is established by showing
regular occupancy or use of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing or exploiting
resources: Delgamuukw, at para 149. Less intensive uses may give rise to different
rights.
44
McNeil, Aboriginal Title, supra note 6 at 202 [footnote omitted].
45
For further criticism of the decision by a retired judge of the British Columbia
Court of Appeal, see Douglas Lambert, “The Tsilhqot’in Case” (2012) 70:6 The
Advocate 819.
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accepts (which I do not 46) that Aboriginal title depends exclusively on
physical occupation of definite tracts of land, the test for occupation
applied by the British Columbia Court of Appeal is inconsistent with
common law authority relating to occupation of land and is therefore too
strict.47 My second criticism is that the site-specific, non-territorial
approach is simply wrong. It pays too much attention to physical
occupation and disregards Indigenous law. As discussed above, this
approach is inconsistent with the Delgamuukw decision.
6. The Common Law Standard for Occupation
I examined the common law requirements for occupation of land and
related them to proof of Aboriginal title in Common Law Aboriginal
Title,48 and so will only summarize the main points here. The case law
reveals that occupation of land is a question of fact that depends on all the
circumstances. The nature of the land and the uses to which it could
reasonably be put at the relevant time have to be taken into account. Lord
O’Hagan put it this way in Lord Advocate v Lord Lovat:
The character and value of the property, the suitable and natural mode of using it, the
course of conduct which the proprietor might reasonably be expected to follow with
a due regard to his own interests – all these things, greatly varying as they must, under
various conditions, are to be taken into account in determining the sufficiency of a
possession.49

46

In Aboriginal Title, supra note 6, I presented Indigenous law title (ch 6) and
common law title (ch 7) as alternative approaches. In Delgamuukw, Lamer CJC combined
these two approaches to produce the territorial approach described above. Thereafter, I
modified my own views to take into account the jurisdictional aspects of Aboriginal title;
see McNeil, “Post-Delgamuukw,” supra note 33; Kent McNeil, “Self-Government and
the Inalienability of Aboriginal Title” (2002) 47 McGill LJ 473; McNeil, “What’s
Happening?” supra note 36. See also Slattery, “Metamorphosis,” supra note 1.
47
See also Nicole Petersen, “The Standard of Occupation for Aboriginal Title in
William v British Columbia”, (April 2013) [unpublished].
48
Supra note 6 at 196-204.
49
(1880), 5 App Cas 273 at 288 (HL), approved in Johnston v O’Neill, [1911] AC
552 at 583 (HL). See also the list of cases cited in McNeil, Aboriginal Title, supra note
6 at 200 n27. Note that, while many of the authorities I am relying on are from the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this is appropriate because the time when the
Tsilhqot’in have to prove their occupation is 1846, the date at which Vickers J held that
the Crown had asserted sovereignty over their territory; Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra
note 38 at paras 601-602.
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A large variety of acts can therefore demonstrate occupation, including
perambulation,50 hunting,51 fishing,52 cutting grass,53 and even blazing
trees.54 In one case that went up on appeal from the British Columbia
Court of Appeal to the Privy Council in London, mere payment of taxes on
wild, unimproved land was held to be sufficient evidence of occupation to
confer title.55 In another case where the only act of occupation was placing
markers at the four corners of the land, the Privy Council found that to be
sufficient. Lord Guest observed:
Their Lordships do not consider that in order to establish possession it is necessary for
a claimant to take some active step in relation to the land such as enclosing the land
or cultivating it. The type of conduct which indicates possession must vary with the
type of land. In the case of vacant and unenclosed land which is not being cultivated
there is little which can be done on the land to indicate possession.56

Moreover, in assessing the acts of occupation, “the conditions of life and
habits and ideas of the people” living there should be taken into account.57
The relevant considerations are therefore social and cultural as well as
physical.
At least as important as physical acts on or in relation to the land is the
intention to hold and use the land for one’s own purposes and to exclude
others who have not been given permission to enter.58 This is why placing
markers or blazing trees around the perimeter of the land demonstrate
occupation, even if the land is not otherwise occupied or used.59 In other
words, the occupier is not obliged to use the land in any particular way, as
50
51

Woolway v Rowe (1834), 1 Ad & E 114 (KB).
Red House Farms Ltd v Catchpole (1976), 244 EG 295 (Engl CA) [Red House

Farms].
52
Curzon v Lomax (1803), 5 Esp 60 (KB); Bristow v Cormican (1874), Ir R 10
CL 398 at 408 (Ex), aff’d (1878), 3 App Cas 641 (HL).
53
Cadija Umma v S Don Manis Appu, [1939] AC 136 (PC) (on appeal from
Ceylon) [Cadija Umma].
54
Halifax Power Co v Christie (1915), 48 NSR 264 at 267 (NSSC) [Halifax
Power].
55
Kirby v Cowderoy, [1912] AC 599 at 602-3 [Kirby].
56
Wuta-Ofei v Danquah, [1961] 1 WLR 1238 at 1243 (PC) [Wuta-Ofei]
[emphasis added].
57
Cadija Umma, supra note 53 at 141-42.
58
See Frederick Pollock and Robert Samuel Wright, An Essay on Possession in
the Common Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888) at 28-36; John M Lightwood, A
Treatise on Possession of Land (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd, 1894) at 9-27; RDC
Stewart, “The Differences between Possession of Land and Chattels” (1933) 11 Can Bar
Rev 651 at 652-56.
59
Wuta-Ofei, supra note 56; Halifax Power, supra note 54.
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long as the intention to occupy is present and manifest through public acts
in relation to the land and no one else is in actual occupation.60
In Marshall/Bernard, McLachlin CJC held that, in assessing
occupation in order to determine whether Aboriginal title has been proven,
a court has to decide whether the Aboriginal relationship with the land was
such that it could be translated into title at common law.61 Relying on
English case law,62 she affirmed that “[t]he common law recognizes that
possession sufficient to ground title is a matter of fact, depending on all the
circumstances, in particular the nature of the land and the manner in which
the land is commonly enjoyed.”63 She noted as well that, “where marshy
land is virtually useless except for shooting, shooting over it may amount
to adverse possession”, and “that a person with adequate possession for
title may use it intermittently or sporadically.”64 Citing Delgamuukw, she
also said that “the common law recognizes that exclusivity does not
preclude consensual arrangements that recognize shared title to the same
parcel of land.”65
McLachlin CJC emphasized that assessment of the practices relied
upon to establish title must take into account the Aboriginal perspective:
The aboriginal perspective grounds the analysis and imbues its every step. It must be
considered in evaluating the practice at issue, and a generous approach must be taken
in matching it to the appropriate modern right.66

For example, she commented as follows on the requirement of exclusivity:
[T]he people may have been peaceful and have chosen to exercise their control by
sharing rather than exclusion. It is therefore critical to view the question of exclusion
from the aboriginal perspective …. It follows that evidence of acts of exclusion is not
required to establish aboriginal title. All that is required is demonstration of effective
control of the land by the group, from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that
it could have excluded others had it chosen to do so.67
60
This explains why payment of taxes on the land was sufficient to establish
occupation in Kirby, supra note 55.
61
Marshall/Bernard, supra note 2 at paras 48-51, 69-70, 78.
62
Powell v McFarlane (1977), 38 P & CR 452 at 471 (ChD).
63
Supra note 2 at para 54.
64
Ibid, citing Red House Farms, supra note 51, and Keefer v Arillotta (1976), 13
OR (2d) 680 (CA).
65
Marshall/Bernard, supra note 2 at para 54, citing Delgamuukw, supra note 6
at para 158.
66
Marshall/Bernard, supra note 2 at para 50; see also paras 45-49, 51, 64, 69-70,
78.
67
Ibid at paras 64-65.
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At common law, effective control can be demonstrated by regular use of
the land, but does not depend on use of specific sites. Indeed, the common
law cases clearly reveal that control of, or even notice of intention to
control, the perimeter of a tract of land is sufficient to establish occupation
of all the land within the perimeter.68
Most of the common law cases in which the issue of sufficiency of
occupation has arisen have involved adverse possession where a
wrongdoer claimed to have acquired a possessory title by ousting the
rightful owner for the statutory limitation period. Aboriginal peoples
claiming Aboriginal title are obviously not wrongdoers – on the contrary,
they are claiming title because they were in rightful occupation of their
traditional lands at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty. The
standard to be applied in determining whether they had the occupation
required for title should therefore be considerably lower than that required
for persons claiming title by adverse possession.69
However, in Tsilhqot’in Nation it is apparent that the British Columbia
Court of Appeal applied a standard higher even than the standard for
adverse possession by wrongdoers. Without referring to a single case
involving sufficiency of occupation at common law, Groberman JA
concluded that intensive and regular use of definite tracts of land is
necessary to establish the occupation required for Aboriginal title. With all
due respect, his test is inconsistent with the common law standard,
approved by McLachlin CJC in Marshall/Bernard, which we have seen is
more concerned with intention to control and exclusion of others than with
specific use of the land, or indeed any use at all.70
Also missing from Groberman JA’s analysis is any serious assessment
of the Aboriginal perspective, which McLachlin CJC said “grounds the
analysis and imbues its every step.”71 Judges should therefore be
examining the evidence carefully to determine what uses and what
standard of occupation and exclusion are appropriate to the specific
68

Wuta-Ofei, supra note 56; Halifax Power, supra note 54.
See R v Marshall, [2004] 1 CNLR 211 (NSCA) at paras 124-38; McNeil,
Aboriginal Title, supra note 6 at 197-99. Even in adverse possession cases, judges have
been much more willing to accord possession to “innocent” persons (i.e. those who
honestly and mistakenly occupy someone else’s land) than to conscious wrongdoers; see
Wood v Gateway of Uxbridge Properties Ltd (1990), 75 OR (2d) 769 (Ont Gen Div); Teis
v Ancaster (Town) (1997), 152 DLR (4th) 304 (Ont CA); Elliott v Woodstock Agricultural
Society, 2008 ONCA 648, 298 DLR (4th) 577 at para 29 (Ont CA).
70
See especially Kirby, supra note 55, a Privy Council decision on appeal from
the British Columbia Court of Appeal, and Wuta-Ofei, supra note 56. See also the
quotation from McLachlin CJC’s judgment in Marshall/Bernard, supra note 43.
71
Marshall/Bernard, supra 2 at para 55: see text accompanying note 66 supra.
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Aboriginal society at the time in the geographical location in question,
taking into account, as Lamer CJC directed in Delgamuukw and
McLachlin CJC affirmed in Marshall/Bernard, “the group’s size, manner
of life, material resources, and technological abilities, and the character of
the lands claimed.”72 This approach is also in keeping with the common
law, which directs that “the conditions of life and habits and ideas of the
people” need to be taken into account.73
7. Conclusion: Applying Delgamuukw
In summary, the main problems I have identified with a strictly common
law approach to Aboriginal title are that it ignores Indigenous law and does
not include governmental authority. As a consequence, it does not take into
account the significant developments in the jurisprudence in the
Delgamuukw and Campbell decisions. Moreover, the British Columbia
Court of Appeal decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation, while purporting to take a
common law approach, in fact applied a test for Aboriginal occupation that
is much stricter even than the common law test for adverse possessors who
are known wrongdoers. The standard of occupation applied by the Court
of Appeal is therefore discriminatory and must be rejected.
The Indigenous law approach, while acknowledging the existence and
continuing application of Indigenous law, suffers from serious shortcomings
that have become glaringly apparent in Australia: (1) in addition to
showing a connection with the land, Indigenous peoples in Australia have
to prove they had laws or customs that gave them rights in relation thereto
prior to Crown acquisition of sovereignty; (2) the content of their land
rights is limited to the rights under their pre-existing laws and customs; (3)
they have no inherent governmental authority that would permit them to
make new laws or significantly change their pre-existing laws; and (4) loss
of their connection with the land and discontinuance of their laws and
customs in relation thereto result in loss of their land rights.
In Delgamuukw, Lamer CJC adopted the common law approach, but
went significantly beyond it by incorporating Indigenous law into the test
for establishing Aboriginal title. In so doing, he acknowledged the
72
Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para 149, quoting from Brian Slattery,
“Understanding Aboriginal Rights” (1987) 64 Can Bar Rev 727 at 758, adopted in
Marshall/Bernard, supra note 2 at para 49. McLachlin CJC also approved La Forest J’s
statement in Delgamuukw that, “when dealing with a claim of ‘aboriginal title’, the court
will focus on the occupation and use of the land as part of the aboriginal society’s
traditional way of life;” see Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para 194 [emphasis in original],
quoted in Marshall/Bernard, supra note 2 at para 49.
73
Cadija Umma, supra note 53 at 141-42.
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importance and relevance of Indigenous law, while avoiding the problems
with native title in Australia by not relying on Indigenous law to define the
content of Aboriginal title. Instead, he maintained that Indigenous law is a
source of Aboriginal title that can be used to prove the occupation upon
which the title depends. Given that a society’s laws in relation to land are
generally territorial in their application,74 Lamer CJC’s conception of
Aboriginal title is necessarily territorial. Moreover, as held by Williamson
J in the Campbell decision, Aboriginal title as conceptualized by Lamer
CJC includes governmental authority. Unlike Aboriginal title under a
strictly common law approach, it is more than a proprietary interest. It is
also jurisdictional.
Lamer CJC’s approach to Aboriginal title is an innovative advance in
the jurisprudence that was concurred in by the current Chief Justice. It
resolves the dilemma of having to choose between the common law and
Indigenous law as the source of Aboriginal title. At the same time, it can
be used to explain the distinction between the external and internal aspects
of Indigenous title, identified by Brian Slattery.75 Externally, as against the
outside world, Aboriginal title is a generic right that, subject to the limit
that the lands cannot be used in ways irreconcilable with the connection
with the land on which the title is based,76 does not vary from one titleholding group to another. Internally, the Indigenous law of each group
continues to apply to govern landholding within their territory. Moreover,
this law is not frozen in time at the moment of Crown assertion of
sovereignty. It is dynamic, and can be modified at any time through the
exercise of the group’s right of internal self-government.77
We have seen that the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s decision in
the Tsilhqot’in Nation case deviated substantially from both the common
law standard for occupation of land and the Delgamuukw decision on the
role of Indigenous law in proving Aboriginal title. In January, 2013, the
Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal. The appeal was heard
on November 7 of that year. With all due respect, I think the Supreme
Court should overturn Groberman JA’s decision and apply the combined
74
The kinds of laws Lamer CJC gave as examples – trespass laws, a land tenure
system, and laws governing land use – tend to be laws of general application that
typically would apply throughout an Indigenous people’s territory; see quotations
accompanying notes 27 and 28, supra.
75
Slattery, “Metamorphosis,” supra note 1 at 270, 279.
76
Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at paras 125-32. For criticism of this inherent limit
on Aboriginal title, see McNeil, “Post-Delgamuukw,” supra note 33 at 116-22.
77
Campbell, supra note 32. See also Brian Slattery, “Making Sense of Aboriginal
and Treaty Rights” (2000) 79 Can Bar Rev 196 at 212-15; McNeil, “What’s
Happening?”, supra note 36 at 291-93.
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common law/Indigenous law approach to proof of Aboriginal title that was
firmly established by the Court’s own decision in Delgamuukw.

